Why pollution standards are preferred by industries: pragmatism and rent-seeking behaviour by Abdul Rahim, Khalid
Why pollution standards are preferred by industries: pragmatism and rent-seeking 
behaviour 
 
ABSTRACT 
Regulatory instruments in environmental policy have strongraison d'etre. They still dominate 
the instruments selected by policy makers. Even with the growing interest in the use of 
economic instruments, in theory, empirical studies and policy, industries tend to prefer 
command-and-control as a practical instrument in pollution control. Polluters often assume 
they have more influence on regulation than on setting effluent charge levels. The industry 
can be better off under the regulatory standard than an imposed effluent charge when the total 
cost of abatement to the industry is considered. The higher costs to the industry make effluent 
charges less attractive. In practice, generally a ‘mixed’ environmental policy is used in which 
regulations dominate. This choice has been based on effectiveness, economic efficiency and 
political acceptability. By simulating the abatement cost function, it was found that 
marketable permits offer an attractive system of pollution control when the scope of variation 
in abatement levels is evident. Unfortunately, at higher levels of abatement, the benefits of 
this system are small and insufficient to justify any regulatory reform. Thus, with a pragmatic 
approach coupled with a rent-seeking behaviour of the polluters, a shift to the use of 
economic instruments is neither likely nor desirable even when administrative and 
transactions costs are not considered. 
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